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LITIGATING FREE SPEECH ISSUES IN THE
TRENCHES
ROBERT M. O'NEIL*

I. INTRODUCTION

How could a First Amendment law professor best explain to
his students that a federal district judge had just ruled that, while
serving as president of the University of Virginia ("UVA"), he had violated the free speech rights of a different group of his very own students? Such a scenario may well seem wholly improbable. Yet, such a
curious paradox inheres in the duality of what may be quite different
roles that a university professor and scholar, on one hand, and a senior academic administrator on the other hand, may more or less
simultaneously engage.
The experience of Lawrence H. Summers, former Harvard
University president, may be illustrative. After having been invited
as an eminent economist to an academic conference, Summers quite
candidly shared with the group his somewhat ambivalent views
about the career prospects of female scholars and teachers within
his demanding academic specialty.' Immediate protest arose within

* Professor of Law Emeritus, University of Virginia School of Law.
Former President of the University of Virginia 1985-1990. B.A., Harvard University, 1956;
A.M., Harvard University, 1957; LL.B., Harvard Law School, 1961. I participated
in FirstAmendmentLaw Review's 2015 Symposium: Free Speech in Higher Education as a panelist on the Practical Perspectives Panel. I spoke about my firsthand experience as the named defendant in Students v. Apartheid Coalitionv.
O'Neil, which was litigated while I was President of the University of Virginia.
1 Lawrence H. Summers, Remarks at NBER Conference on Diversifying the Science
and Engineering Workforce, HARVARD THE OFFICE OF THE PRESIDENT (Jan. 14, 2005),
http://www.harvard.edu/president/speeches/summers_2005/nber.php.
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the group, some conference participants even charging Summers
with sexism. 2 Despite strong support from others at the conference,
including several senior female colleagues, Summers's presidential
tenure had been severely tarnished.3 Within two years, he relinquished his administrative role primarily (though not entirely) because of this incident and its widespread implications. 4 Although the
analogy between my experience and that of President and Professor
Summers is imperfect, the parallel is striking and helps to set the
stage for the challenge that now bears close scrutiny.
II. STUDENTsAGAINSTAPARTHEID COALITION V. O'NEIL

Students Against Apartheid Coalition v. O'Neil5 (SAAC I) arose

nearly three decades ago, but the memories remain strikingly vivid.
SAAC I involved the location of, and my administrative decision to
remove (albeit with the governing board's approval), several crude
wooden "shanties" that a student group had erected on the University's historic central Lawn to convey their protest over the racial climate in South Africa. 6 Specifically, the student group protested the
persistence of apartheid, and more immediately their insistence that
the Board of Visitors should immediately divest its financial holdings
that were arguably tainted by South African policies. 7 Although the
University administration eventually prevailed after substantially refining the policy that had triggered removal of the shanties,8 this
daunting experience taught me much about First Amendment litiga-

2

Marcella Bombardieri, Summers' Remarks on Women Draw Fire, BOSTON.COM

2005),
17,
(Jan.
http://www.boston.com/news/education/higher/articles/2 005/01/17/summ
ersremarksonwomendrawfire/?p age=full.
3Id.
4Marcella Bombardieri & Maria Sacchetti, Summers to Step Down, Ending Tu22,
2006),
BOSTON.COM
(Feb.
mult
at
Harvard,
http://www.boston.com/news/education/higher/articles/2006/02/22/summ
erstostep-downwendingtumult atharvard/?page=full.
s 660 F. Supp. 333 (W.D. Va. 1987).
6Id. at 334-35.
7 Id. at 335-36.
8 Students Against Apartheid Coal. v. O'Neil, 838 F.2d 735 (4th Cir. 1988).
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tion that I had never learned-or for that matter ever taught-in law
school. Perhaps I could set the stage by quoting a thoughtful sentence by Judge James Turk of the Western District of Virginia from
the initial ruling of the federal district court: "At the root of this case
are two historically significant American institutions-the First
Amendment to the Constitution and the campus of the University of
Virginia, Thomas Jefferson's architectural masterpiece." 9 Given my
role, I had always felt that Mr. Jefferson would have wished to keep
the area adjoining his sacred Rotunda free of intrusive structures.
Yet, as a longtime teacher and scholar of free speech and press law, I
was acutely conscious of the tension that Judge Turk had posed.1o
The initial ruling in SAAC I came down in mid-May 1987.11 It
proved mercifully to be somewhat narrower than the Board of Visitors and I had feared. The scope of the potential ruling had already
been sharpened substantially when both parties agreed to legally
significant stipulations. 12 We had agreed, for example, that the shanties are "symbolic and evocative lifesize representations for illustrative, educative and persuasive purposes, of the dwellings of black
south Africa in the ghettoes of apartheid."1 3 Thus, the basic substantive issue of whether the placement of the shanties (and their challenged forcible removal) was a form of protected speech effectively
became moot
The surviving legal questions, however, were hardly trivial.
What remained were essentially issues of "time, place, and manner
of expression" 14-hardly unimportant if more limited. In his opinion,
Judge Turk clearly recognized the transcendent effect upon the case
of broad constitutional protection for the expression of public university students as well as potential limitations, noting specifically
that "[t]he defendants do have the authority to regulate protected

9 Students Against Apartheid Coal., 660 F. Supp. at 334-35.
10 Although I served as President of the University of Virginia from August 1,
1985 through July 31, 1990, I also taught one course in the School of Law each
semester, either in Constitutional Law or Intellectual Property.
" See Students AgainstApartheidCoal., 660 F. Supp. at 333.
12 Id. at 337.
13

Id.

14 Id. at 338.
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student expression by enacting reasonable restrictions on time,
place and manner."1 5 The district court thus acknowledged the discrepancy between the challenged policies and constitutional
norms. 16
Specifically, we had argued to the district court that the shanties impaired the integrity of the historic Lawn-which, indeed, was
effectively the living room for those fifty-some UVA students whose
extracurricular achievements entitled them to inhabit these coveted
spaces.1 7 As Judge Turk was keenly aware (though not himself a UVA
graduate), that open green space was unique among college campuses.18 Indeed, the nearly universal term "campus" has always been
preempted by the far more clearly Jeffersonian designation "Lawn"
as much in current as in ancient parlance.1 9 We also argued in federal court that less restrictive and alternative means-for example,
placing shanties remotely from the Rotunda 20-must be preferred
"to protect [UVA's] sole interest in the esthetic integrity of the campus." 21

We suspected that things would not go smoothly even for so
generally sympathetic a jurist as Judge Turk.22 Thus, we were hardly
surprised when, after carefully reviewing the evidence, he ruled unambiguously that "[t]he University fail[ed] to prove a sufficient nexus between its esthetic interest and its broad restraint of plaintiffs'
communicative behavior." 23 That judgment more than fully sufficed

1s

Id. at 340.

16

Id.

17 Id. at 338.
18 See id.

&

19 Id. passim (referencing the "Lawn" not "campus" throughout the opinion).
20 Id. at 337, 339.
21 Id. at 337.
22 Judge Turk was known as a sympathetic, but fair, judge. See Jeff Sturgeon

Laurence Hammack, Gentle jurist Turk Let Mercy Have a Say in His Courtroom,
ROANOKE TIMEs (July 7, 2014), http://www.roanoke.com/news/gentle-juristturk-let-mercy-have-a-say-in-his/article_96657eb4-3791-5042-b910cca37dfa4a5e.html. He passed away in 2014 after his 41-year tenure on the
federal bench. Id.
23 Students AgainstApartheid Coal., 660 F. Supp. at 339.
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to resolve the case, and left us with an urgent need to refine and
sharpen the now clearly unconstitutional policy over the summer.
Judge Turk had focused more sharply upon two non-trivial
issues in the challenged regulations. First, the student plaintiffs specifically complained about the vagueness of the terms "structure"
and "extended presence." 24 Judge Turk accepted their claims, ruling
that "the language is so vague that it fails to alert students as to the
scope of its prohibitions and therefore may discourage students
from using the lawn as a forum even for clearly protected expression." 25 We then had no option but to acknowledge the lack of clarity
and precision in rules that traced back a decade or two. Additionally,
just to be sure we had not missed his central message, Judge Turk
concluded that "none of the[] alternatives [were] sufficient to vitiate
the University's sweeping restraints on its students' protected behavior."2 6 Judge Turk specifically rejected the University's argument
that the restrictions were valid because of alternative means by
which and places at which the protesting students could convey their
message. 27
Early that fall, we were back before Judge Turk in Students
Against Apartheid Coal. v. O'Neil (SAAC II), bringing with us a substantially revised set of regulations approved by the Board of Visitors in late May. 28 Although the plaintiff students now claimed that
the distinctions were immaterial, and indeed argued that we were
seeking to relitigate crucial matters, the judge now took a more sympathetic view. 2 9 Specifically, Judge Turk now found that "the University's revisions, although minor in appearance, substantively change
the Lawn Use Policy and warrant a new constitutional analysis of the
amended policy."30

24
25

Id.
Id.

26

Id.

27

Id.

Students Against Apartheid Coal. v. O'Neil, 671 F. Supp. 1105 (W.D. Va. 1987),
affd, 838 F.2d 735 (4th Cir. 1988).
29 See id. at 1107.
28

30

Id. at 1106.
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Details of the revision process may amplify our subtle, if not
vital, refinement While deleting the imprecise term "extended presence," we defined "structure" with greater clarity,3 1 borrowing numerous examples from current National Park Service regulations. 32
Specifically, we confined University authority to remove or relocate a
structure to barring the use of a wheel chair, permitting such use only when physically occupied by a handicapped person.3 3 We also defined with greater precision what did not constitute a "structure." 34
Accordingly, Judge Turk accepted the substantially more precise geographical limits we had now added-notably, by forbidding
structures only on the south side of the Rotunda.3 5 The federal court
ruled that the remaining area allowed the plaintiff students to "erect
structures on the remaining three sides of the Rotunda . . . ."36 Judge
Turk now seemed ready to validate the revised policy as "narrowly
tailored to achieve the University's professed esthetic interest in
preserving the Lawn's architectural purity."3 7 Moreover, the revised
policy appeared both "content neutral" and "permit[ted] students a
wide array of additional modes of communication." 38
All that remained was to await a likely appeal to the Fourth
Circuit, which Steven Rosenfeld, attorney for the students, filed soon

Id. at 1108-09. The new University policy defined structure as including
"props and displays, such as coffins, crates, crosses, theaters, cages, and statues;
furniture, and furnishings, such as desks, tables (except those temporarily used
by participant in the ceremonies or by University officials for the conduct of the
ceremonies), bookcases, and cabinets; shelters, such as tents, boxes, shanties
and other enclosures; and other similar physical structures. The term "structure" does not include chairs, signs held by hand, bicycles, baby carriages, and
baby strollers temporarily placed in, or being moved across the Lawn; and
wheelchairs and other devices for the handicapped when used by handicapped
persons." Id. at 1109.
32 Deborah Slaton, The Preparationand Use of Historic Structure Reports, NAT'L
PARK SERV. (Apr. 2005), http://www.nps.gov/tps/how-to-preserve/briefs/43historic-structure-reports.htm.
33 Students AgainstApartheidCoal., 671 F. Supp. at 1109.
34 Id. at 1107-08.
31

3s Id.
36

37

38

Id. at 1107.
Id.
Id. at 1108.
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after the later ruling. In early February 1988, a three-judge panel entered a per curiam order in Students Against Apartheid Coalition v.
O'Neil (SAAC 111).39 The Fourth Circuit noted that, under the most applicable Supreme Court ruling,40 "[i]t is now well established that
aesthetic concerns alone constitute a permissible governmental interest" 41 The appellate court, confirming its assent through a brief
closing paragraph, stressed that "the regulation meets the Clark
test." 42
Several striking ironies mark this novel case. There had, in
fact, been two nearly identical (and simultaneous) cases filed by antiapartheid students: Students Against Apartheid Coalition v. O'Neil4 3
and University of Utah Students Against Apartheid v. Peterson.4 4 Each
case challenged the regulation of the placement of crude shanties in
symbolic protest of conditions in South Africa. 45 The parallels were
even more remarkable than their initial concurrence might suggest
University of Utah Students Against Apartheid v. Peterson involved the
University of Utah and a student group that shared the UVA protestors' views. 46 The president of that institution-also named personally as principal defendant-just happened to be my immediate

39 Students Against Apartheid Coal. v. O'Neil, 838 F.2d 735 (4th Cir. 1988).
40 See Clark v. Community for Creative Non-Violence, 468 U.S. 288, 293 (1984).
The Fourth Circuit relied on the Clark test, stating, "the validity of the University
regulation depends on whether it is content neutral, narrowly tailored to meet a
significant government interest and leaves open other channels of communication." Students Against Apartheid Coal., 838 F.2d at 736 (citing Clark, 468 U.S. at
293 (1984)).
41 Students AgainstApartheidCoal., 838 F.2d at 737.
42

Id.

43 660 F. Supp. 333 (W.D. Va. 1987).
44 649 F. Supp. 1200 (D. Utah 1986).
4s See Students Against Apartheid Coal., 660 F. Supp. at 333; Univ. of Utah Students Against Apartheid, 649 F. Supp. at 1200; see generally Laura Goodman,
Note, Shacking Up with The FirstAmendment: Symbolic Expression and the Public
University, 64 IND. L.J. 711 (1989) (regarding the coincidental adjudication of
two cases that challenged strikingly comparable regulations on the presence
and location of "shanties" as a form of student protest against apartheid in
South Africa and seeking university divestment of financial ties with South Africa while apartheid persisted).
46 See Univ. of Utah Students Against Apartheid, 649 F. Supp. at 1200.
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predecessor as board chair of the National Association of State Universities and Land-Grant Colleges (now the Association of Public and
Land-Grant Universities or APLU).47
Despite the incredible parallels, the two cases proved not to
be precisely identical. Unlike in the University of Utah in University of
Utah Students Against Apartheid,4 8 UVA readily conceded the expressive nature of the anti-apartheid protests, leaving only regulation of
time, place, and manner in SAAC I49 There were, however, other minor variances. The University of Utah administration, unlike its UVA
counterparts, had invoked multiple interests in its defense: (1) substantial security concerns; (2) a risk of legal liability; and (3) considerable expense, apparently reflecting occasional violence affecting
the shanties which had no counterpart in Charlottesville.5 0 Moreover, the Utah administration had no detailed regulation comparable
even to UVA's modest policy.5 1
The eventual outcome also curiously differed between the
two cases. The Utah case resulted in entry of an injunction, leaving
the crafting of the details to the parties, 52 which eventually proved
acceptable and workable. No other comparable litigation seems to
have occurred, presumably because of dramatic changes in the government and policy of South Africa and investment policies. There is,
however, one extremely helpful and perceptive article, apparently
the only scholarly analysis of the coincidental convergence of these

47 See Three to Receive HAA Medal for ExtraordinaryService, HARVARD GAZETTE
(Apr. 27, 2006), http://news.harvard.edu/gazette/2006/04.27/05-haa.html.
The actual parallel was even more striking in a humorous way. When Chase Peterson, Utah's president, learned that I had shamelessly recruited to Virginia
both an athletic director and a medical affairs VP, he ventured that I owed him a
quarterback and a first round administrative colleague. Alas, I never delivered
on either demand.
48 Univ. of Utah Students AgainstApartheid, 649 F. Supp. at 1209-11 (addressing
the issue of the expressive nature of the students' speech and determining that
their speech was considered symbolic speech under the First Amendment).
4 See Students AgainstApartheidCoal., 660 F. Supp. at 335.
50 Univ. of Utah Students AgainstApartheid, 649 F. Supp. at 1202.
s1 See id. at 1209-10.
52 Id. at 1211.
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two nearly identical decisions.5 3 It bears closer scrutiny in a later
section of this Essay.54
III. A FEW PRACTICAL PERSPECTIVES

Within the spirit of "practical perspectives," let me now share
a few observations nearly three decades after these cases ran their
course. First, the subject matter of these two strikingly similar federal court cases is novel in several respects. The Universities of Utah
and Virginia, despite geographical and other contrasts, are similar in
regard to governance. Each institution is singularly a creature of
state statute, and thus quite unlike local campuses within public system which are governed by a single statewide board.55 On the other
hand, neither of these flagship institutions enjoys the state constitutional stature of each of Michigan's public campuses or the Universi-

s See Goodman, supra note 45. This article (despite the obvious importance of
the topic) seems to have no counterpart among cited journal and review articles
and notes.
s' Let me note in passing a quite different, but equally striking, irony. Although
the young lawyer who filed the UVA shanty lawsuit, Steven Rosenfeld, proved a
worthy adversary in court, our constitutional values were otherwise quite congenial. We had both served as regional ACLU officers and board members-I as
within the Northern California branch and the national advisory board, while
Steve held comparable roles in the Central Virginia ACLU. We had both published papers that revealed comparably sensitive and protective views on campus free speech issues, and I had been an expert witness in a related case. See
generally ROBERT O'NEIL, ACADEMIC FREEDOM IN THE WIRED WORLD (2008); THE
CENTER FOR CONSTITUTIONAL RIGHTS, THE JAILHOUSE LAWYER's HANDBOOK

(Rachel

Meeropol & Ian Head eds., 5th ed. 2010) (commending Steven Rosenfeld for his
"work defending the Handbook in Virginia").
Yet, when Steven filed the complaint in federal court in Roanoke-naming
me as the principal defendant we immediately became adversaries despite
our otherwise congenial views. Regrettably, despite our daunting exchange in
Judge Turk's courtroom and otherwise quite compatible legal careers, I believe
we never had the opportunity to meet or share constitutional insights.
ss States that use this system include California, Texas, North Carolina, New
York, or Wisconsin. The University of Wisconsin System and the University of
North Carolina remain the only two multi-campus university systems with a
single governing board reporting directly to the state's governor, although
North Carolina's separate campuses also include state-appointed local boards.
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ty of California's ten campuses (though such autonomy does not extend to the California State University network). In only one respect
does the parallel fail: Although the University of Virginia was a charter member of the Association of American Universities (AAU) (or
would have been had its first president not taken office until 1904),56
Utah has never quite merited AAU status even though it has been a
highly regarded comprehensive public university-with its then
president chairing the National Association of State Universities. 5 7
Second, the very nature of the regulated expression that
emerged both in Charlottesville and Salt Lake City was, in many
ways, unique. As Laura Goodman noted perceptively in the student
law journal note cited earlier, "The unique character of the [shanties]
made it clear that the only substantial benefits of the shacks were
expressive."5 8 Thus, she adds, "The message of the shanties is focused; the subject matter of the demonstrations is precise, and the
intended audience is readily ascertainable."5 9 Properly avoiding the
minor factual differences between a briefly confrontational exchange
in Salt Lake City and the absence of such tensions in Charlottesville,
the parallels between the two sets of First Amendment claims are
indeed striking. One wonders, for example, how different the outcomes might have been absent the stipulations in SAAC I.
Third, the shared applicability to both cases of governing Supreme Court rulings is equally striking. As Goodman also notes, cases

The Association of American Universities was created in 1900 by fourteen
major
research
institutions.
AsS'N
OF
Am.
UNIVs.,
http://www.aau.edu/about/default.aspx?id=58. The University of Virginia
would clearly have been a charter member had it had a president at that time.
Edwin Alderman, having previously served as president of Tulane University,
was appointed by the Board of Visitors as the University's first president, assuming office in 1904. Mark L. McCallon, Edwin Anderson Alderman,
56

ENCYCLOPEDIA

VIRGINIA,

http://www.encyclopediavirginia.org/alderman-edwinanderson_1861-1931.
s7 Chase N. Peterson served in 1988-89 as national chairman of what was the
National Association of State Universities and Land-Grant Colleges (NASULGC),
later renamed Association of Public and Land-Grant Universities (APLU]. I succeeded Dr. Peterson as Chairman of NASULGC the following year, 1989-90.
58 Goodman, supra note 45, at 719 (footnotes omitted).
s9 Id. at 720.
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such as United States v. O'Brien60 (favoring the use of least restrictive
means and narrow tailoring) and Clark v. Community for Creative
Non-Violence61 (regarding the primacy of precise time, place, and
manner regulations) helped both Utah and UVA to guide, and eventually resolve, both disputes in the respective institutions' favor despite the validity of the initial student challenge in court by student
groups protesting apartheid and seeking immediate divestment of
South Africa-related portfolio holdings. 62
Fourth, let me note several other facets of First Amendment
law from both a professor's and a practitioner's vantage. For one, the
contrast between teaching and scholarship in the First Amendment
area on the one hand and practicing in that field of law on the other
is seriously undervalued. Even for those of us who have authored or
joined many amicus curiae briefs over the years, the difference between being sued as a named defendant and engaging even as an active participant in civil liberties litigation is dramatic. As a practical
matter, classroom discussion and analysis of constitutional questions risks an awkward conflict of roles when one is both a party to
free speech and press litigation and a commentator on pending cases. One can seldom simultaneously pursue both paths.
Fifth, for those of us in the public sector, the role of attorneys
general and their deputies and associates is absolutely crucial. As a
longstanding member of the National Association of College and University Attorneys (NACUA), I have on many occasions been deeply
grateful for the guidance, support, and counsel of such professional
colleagues. In the process of serving for many years as a senior university administrator, I have invariably welcomed such guidance despite the potential conflict between being both attorney and client

391 U.S. 367 (1968).
468 U.S. 288 (1984).
62 The district judge who decided the Utah students' case concluded his opinion
with this invitation: "If the parties are unable to agree on other problems that
arise relating to the imposition of the injunction, they may request the court's
further assistance." Univ. of Utah Students Against Apartheid v. Peterson, 649 F.
Supp. 12 00, 1211 (D. Utah 1986). Apparently a settlement was indeed soon thereafter reached, chiefly because the University of Utah's board had divested its
South African related (and thus apartheid-tainted) holdings. Id.
60
61
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during my years of teaching and writing in the First Amendment
field. By a curious twist, I was some years later aided by wise counsel
provided by the Utah Attorney General's office in regard to a case involving a Mormon drama student who refused as a matter of conscience to perform unclad and who also objected to uttering profanity.63

Sixth, perhaps the clearest lesson of having endured such
real-world experience is the ease with which an academic expert
may forget the need for careful scrutiny of potentially actionable
regulatory language. In retrospect, I must confess my failure to have
parsed with great care operative phrases such as "extended presence" and the infinite varieties of "structures." There must somewhere in the late Yogi Berra's lexicon a maxim like "all legal analogies are inherently misleading, including this one."
Finally, in a rather different dimension, I would concur fully
with my long-time Thomas Jefferson Center Board Chair Bruce Sanford, a pre-eminent First Amendment litigator and partner at Baker
& Hostetler, who has observed (and chronicled) what he laments as
an alarming and widening gap between scholars and litigators in regard to free speech and press values and precepts. 64 Such a disparity,
he argues forcefully, affects (and thus separates) even those of us
who do engage actively both in teaching and practice in the First
Amendment area, crafting amicus briefs and otherwise contributing
to advancing understanding and insight 65 The occasions for genuine
collaboration in our field seem regrettably to be diminishing. Perhaps this troubling dichotomy warrants another First Amendment
Law Review symposium.

See Axson-Flynn v. Johnson, 356 F.3d 1277 (10th Cir. 2004).
Conversations with Bruce Sanford, Partner, Baker & Hosteler. During the two
decades Bruce Sanford chaired the board while I was the director at the Thomas Jefferson Center (TJC), we had many informal discussions (including other
colleagues) about this topic. His exemplary views were widely shared with others, including other TJC Trustees.
65 Id.
63

64

